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Abstract:
Background:
In Iran, historically, establishing, maintaining, and continuing family units have been perpetuated through the development of strong
ideals  about  marriage  and  reproduction  that  are  integrated  with  Islamic  values.  Despite  the  long  tradition  of  marriage  as  the
foundation of both family and society, the data show there are declines in both the rate and the number of marriages. The popular
belief among both laymen and social scientists is that, while there has been a decline in permanent marriages, there has been an
increase in the number of what can be called temporary marriages. There are no data demonstrating trends in these marriages.
Methods:
In this paper, we present data on the declining trend in marriage and review the literature on factors considered as a barrier toward
marriage. In addition, we examine data from a snowball sample of couples involved in temporary marriages or Sighe.
Results:
Our  analysis  suggests  that  those  in  such  marriages  may  generally  ignore  or  defy  cultural  prescriptions  and  proscriptions  about
marriage, seemingly reflecting a more modernistic view.
Conclusion:
From this perspective, we suggest that both recorded and non-recorded temporary marriages may reflect changing attitudes that stress
individualism, autonomy, and secularism and, particularly for the young who are engaged in Sighe, the postponing of parenthood
and, indeed, of adulthood.
Keywords: Cohabitation, Temporary Marriage, Remarriage, Polygamy, Iran, Family.
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Historically, families in Iran have been the centers of production and reproduction. The extended patriarchal family
has provided social and economic support for members of all ages, including married children [1, 2]. Families have
been  the  primary  units  for  organizing  nearly  all  of  the  social  activities  of  life,  including  production,  consumption,
education,  socialization,  reproduction,  leisure,  and  living  arrangements.  Establishing,  maintaining,  and  continuing
family units have been encouraged through a strong set of ideals about family morality integrated with Islamic values
and pre-Islamic religion. Historically, within this idealized family morality, marriage has been essentially universal, age
at marriage has generally been quite low, and marriage contracts have been included and protected by members of
extended  families  and  by  the  legal  and  religious community. In this paper, we review the recent trend in registered
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marriages and provide an insight into non-registered marriages which are referred to as temporary marriages or Sighe
marriages, using data collected in a large urban area in a western province of Iran.
1.1. The Trend in Registered Marriage
In  Iran,  the  law requires  that  marriages  must  be registered in  notary public  offices  (Mahzar).  These offices  are
required to send a monthly report of their record to the provincial offices of the Civil Registration System. In turn, all
these records are sent to the office of Civil Registration System in the capital city of Tehran where they are organized
and  published  annually.  For  legal  purposes,  the  detailed  information  about  each  marriage  and  circumstances  and
conditions of the husband and wife are available in the local notary office unless the marriage is not permanent and is
not required to be legally registered. Utilizing this source of data, we review the trend in registered marriages in recent
decades.
Over the past three decades, there has been a significant transformation in the demography of Iran. A major part of
this  transformation  has  been  the  evolving  patterns  of  fertility  behavior  and  speedy  transition  to  replacement  level
fertility  across  rural  and  urban  areas  [2].  The  United  Nations  Population  Division  described  the  Iranian  fertility
transition as the largest percentage change in the world between 1975-1980 and 2005-2010 [3]. An important aspect of
this process of swift fertility decline is the evolving patterns of union formation. Age at marriage for both males and
females has increased significantly during this period and both the number and rate of recorded permanent marriages
have declined markedly (Table 1). For example, between 2010 and 2014, the number of registered marriages declined
about 18% and the estimated rate of marriage declined from 11.8 to 9.1 per 1000 population. This emerging trend is at
odds  with  the  strong  conventional  emphasis  on  transition  to  marriage  as  part  of  the  traditional  fundamentals  of
adulthood and social identity for young men and women.
Table 1. Number and rate of marriage in Iran, 2010-2014.
Year Numbers % change Population Rate of Marriage
2010 891627 - 7.5E+07 11.9
2011 874792 -1.9 7.6E+07 11.5
2012 829968 -5.1 7.7E+07 10.7
2013 774513 -6.7 7.9E+07 9.9
2014 724324 -6.5 8E+07 9.1
2010-2014 changes -18.8   -23.5
     
Mean age of marriage 1986 1996 2006 2011
     
Male 23.6 25.6 26.2 26.7
Female 19.8 22.4 23.2 23.4
Source: Calculated from Statistical Center of Iran, 2014 [26]
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  there  have  been  strong  governmental  and  non-governmental  (i.e.  charity
organization) efforts that not only advocate traditional marriage but also offer financial supporting to young men and
women in establishing permanent family unions. Still, there are declines in both traditional marriage numbers and rates.
In an attempt to understand these declines, Salehi-Isfahani and his colleagues used extensive survey and census data to
examine the causes of marriage decline in the context of “growing up and transition to adulthood in Iran” [4, 5]. Salehi-
Isfahani relates the decline in marriage to a number of factors, an important one being the bulging youth population
which has been growing at a rate of five percent per year and has resulted in difficulty for young people in finding
employment. Another factor to which change is attributed is the lack of quality education that provides skills needed for
employment. Specifically, what he referred to is not simply the low quality of education in Iran but also a mismatch
between  what  students  learn  in  schools  and  what  employers  need,  a  mismatch  which  limits  the  employment
opportunity.  The  decline  in  public  sector  jobs  is  also  cited  as  one  more  factor  that  again  limits  employment
opportunities. Another important factor suggested as contributing to declining marriage in Iran is a marriage market
squeeze caused by the shortage of eligible men. Gholipour and Fazanegan [6] analyzed provincial and individual-level
data from an economic perspective and concluded that housing costs are a major deterrent to marriage and hence an
important explanation of the decline of marriage is the limited access to affordable housing for those age groups in
which, marriage takes place traditionally. Azad-Armaky and his colleagues [7] suggest that these economic obstacles
and overall economic insecurity, particularly with respect to jobs and lack of long-term stability, are the reasons why
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young  men  and  women  avoid  traditional  permanent  marriages  requiring  long-term  commitments  and  may  instead
pursue temporary relationship through Sighe, which removes the requirements for more extensive traditional economic
ceremonies and obligations.
1.2. Temporary Marriage
Sighe is a temporary marriage that is sanctioned by the Shia sect of Islam, which is the dominant religion in Iran
practiced by 96 percent of the population. That Sighe be considered as a legal union, it is generally expected to include
certain  agreements,  the  elements  of  which  defined  by  religious  scholars  (Foghaha)  vary.  For  example,  the
contemporary religious authority and the highest ranking political leader in the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei,
stated the conditions of temporary marriage (Sighe) in his Book of Directions (Fathwas) as following:
Temporary marriage must include a marriage contract;
There must be a clear statement of the duration of the temporary marriage contract;
The amount of Mahr (money or property given to the woman) must be clearly stated at the time the marriage
contract is set forth;
If it is desired that the union continues beyond the contracted period, the contract must be renewed. If it is not
renewed, the woman must separate from the man and wait for a required period of three months and 10 days
before she marries again. (This is to ascertain if she is pregnant, presumably with the man with whom she had
the temporary marriage contract).
In  case  the  female  is  a  virgin  at  the  inception  of  the  contract,  the  permission  of  the  father  is  strongly
recommended, but not required.
That recording needs not to take place (and one may assume that neither the existence of nor the elements of a
contract can be known) and can be seen in the comments of other religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani, who
served as the president in the Islamic Republic for two terms, who expressed less restrictive conditions for temporary
marriage (quoted in Haeri [8]):
Ayatollah Rafsanjani suggested that young men and women who might feel shy about going to a mullah to register
their  temporary marriage need not  do so.  They could agree among themselves (i.e.,  have a private contract)  “to be
together for a month or two.” If the performance of the marriage ceremony in Arabic is difficult, he suggested, “the
young couple can recite the formula in Persian and in the absence of a mullah or other witnesses.”
While Ayatollah Rafsanjani was a pioneer,  in the 1990s, in his public expression of easing of the conditions of
temporary marriage, especially in stating the acceptability of private and verbal contract between consenting males and
female, other religious leaders have expressed a similar point of view.
Temporary marriage (Sighe) is not new in Iran. There is a long history of such unions among the Shia population of
Iran  especially  among  merchants  and  long-distance  travelers  [9].  However,  since  the  establishment  of  the  Islamic
Republic  and,  in  particular,  since  public  advocacy  for  temporary  marriage  in  the  1980s  and  1990s  to  deal  with
widowhood and other consequences of the Iran-Iraq war, feminist social science discourse on the origin, interpretation,
and social consequence of temporary marriage has increased [8, 10 - 15]. Along with the statements of religious leaders
and the increased feminist discourse about this issue, there is increasing casual observation and anecdotal evidence
pointing  to  the  increasing  use  of  temporary  marriage  arrangements  as  a  religiously  permitted  source  of  intimacy,
companionship, and sexual satisfaction [7, 16 - 18].
While lay people and social scientists speculate about the number of temporary marriages, as noted above, there is
not a legal requirement to register there marriages. Therefore, registries may provide information about couples who
have  established  recorded  Sighe  unions,  but  there  are  no  reliable  national  or  regional  data  on  the  number  of  non-
recorded Sighe unions, the content of any contractual agreements made, or the characteristics of couples in terminal
marriages. Of particular interest is whether people in terminal marriages in Iran are primarily young couples living in
non-recorded marriages who are essentially following the cohabitation patterns that have emerged in Western societies
since the 1970s [19]. In this paper, in order to begin to shed some light on these questions, we explore the data collected
from a purposive sample of couples in one large urban area in Iran.
2. DATA AND METHOD
The data from this study were collected from the large urban area of Kermanshah with a population of 850 thousand
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in  western  Iran.  The  city  represents  other  provincial  capitals  in  Iran  in  terms  of  the  size  and  urban  amenities.  The
population of the city is diverse and is heavily Kurdish in ethnicity. The target population for our research was couples
who were engaged in temporary marriages as of 2013.
We reasoned that, despite legal support and religious permission, couples engaged in temporary marriage would be
considered  to  be  in  violation  of  historically  pervasive  societal  norms  about  the  sanctity  of  legal  marriage  and
parenthood.  Because of  this,  we reasoned that  they would be unlikely to talk about  their  marriages except  to close
family members and friends and thus not easily identifiable in the population. As a result, collecting data, particularly
through probability sampling, from this population has been very challenging. Because of such difficulties, for this
research, we contacted informants in different settings - government offices, businesses, hospitals, higher education
institutions,  recreational  facilities  -  to  identify  target  couples  in  their  settings  and  to  ask  people  known  to  be  in  a
temporary union if they would give consent to meet with trained research staff members. In an initial contact, people
agreeing to such a meeting, met with a member of the research staff who explained the purpose of the study, obtained
consent for participation, and arranged a date and time for an interview. The subsequent interviews lasting about one
hour were conducted by graduate students who had been trained as interviewers. Through this procedure, we were able
to collect data from 27 couples engaged in temporary unrecorded marriages in 2013. There is no doubt that this is a
small dataset and in no way a representative sample of couples in temporary marriage in Iran. Hence, any statistical
conclusion from the results should be viewed as illustrative and with caution in terms of generalization.
3. RESULTS
The data  were analyzed by SPSS version 24.  The age distribution of  the couples  studied had a  wide range:  for
husbands, it was between 20 and 63; for wives, between 18 and 48. The mean age of men was 40 years; for women, it
was 32 years (Table 2). The duration of marriage ranged from 1 to 27 years; the average was about nine years. The age
and duration of temporary marriage point to the diversity of the population engaged in temporary marriages and perhaps
the  variation  in  reasons  for  choosing  this  union  option.  These  couples  were  not  all  young  cohabiting  individuals
avoiding permanent marriage because of economic or housing constraints. Furthermore, when asked about the duration
of their marriage, couples referred to how long they had been married and did not discuss any specific duration about
which they had set forth a contract or agreement for Sighe.
Table 2. Socio-demographic description of the sample couples.
Age Male (%) Female (%)
18-29 11.1 37
30-39 44.4 37
40-49 18.5 25.9
50 and above 25.9 0
 100 100
Mean 40.5 32.4
   
Duration of union (Years)   
5-Jan 55.6  
6 and more 44.4  
 100  
Mean 8.9  
   
Pre-Union status   
Never-married 59.3 74.1
Divorced from permanent marriage 14.8 18.5
Widow 3.7 7.4
Married (polygamy) 22.2 0
 100 100
Education   
Less than high school 29.7 55.6
High school 40.7 22.2
Some college 29.6 22.2
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Age Male (%) Female (%)
 100 100
   
Residential background   
Urban 40.7 40.7
Rural 59.3 59.3
 100 100
   
Circumstances of meeting   
Within family 40.7  
Within neighborhood 25.9  
Education Institution, work place, parks and restaurants 33.4  
 100  
   
Total number of couples 27  
Based on the marital status of men before entering Sighe union, the couples in this sample can be divided into three
groups: those who were never married; those who were divorced or widowed; and those who were concurrently married
to a permanent wife. The men in this third group were thus polygamous on entering their current temporary marriage.
Twenty percent (6) of the sample was in this polygamous state. Such a polygamous state is permitted by religious code
and law in Iran, but it is specified that such arrangements demonstrate economic reasons and require permission of the
first wife. While we do not have supportive data from this sample, it is possible that men defined as polygamous in our
sample were using non-contractual Sighe unions in order to avoid meeting the required economic conditions or, more
importantly, the consent of the first wife. While we did not obtain such information, it  is also possible that women
living in a non-recorded Sighe relationship with a married man might be unhappy with the temporary situation. While it
is important to note that children from this kind of union (i.e., the one in which the male is in a polygamous state) have
the same legal status as children of the permanent wife; a Sighe wife does not have the social prestige of a permanent
wife and does not share the same privileges.
The women who are engaged in polygamous marriages are much younger than their husbands. Five of these women
were 35 years old or younger. On the other hand, four of their husbands were 52 years or older at the time of the study.
Hence, at least based on this limited data, temporary marriage continues to provide an avenue of the temporary union
for pleasure, companionship, or other personal reasons for older men who continue to keep their original household and
permanent wife separate from their Sighe arrangement. While Sighe relationships have been traditionally and societally
accepted in the Iranian culture, in the past, women who have been involved in temporary marriages with legally married
men have been young widows or divorcees and/or were financially destitute.  However,  from our limited sample, it
seems that in contemporary circumstances, young never-married women are willing to enter into this kind of union.
Among the six women in the polygamous union through temporary marriage, half (3) never married previously.
Another group in our sample of couples consisted of men who had been divorced and widowed and now pursued
temporary rather than permanent contractual marriage. Three of these men had formed unions with women who were
themselves divorced, while two were in relationships with never-married women. It should be noted that traditionally it
has  been  easier  for  divorced  men  to  pursue  young  never-married  women  either  for  permanent  marriages  or  Sighe
unions. However, this was less true of divorced and young widowed women who, because of the scarcity of possible
partners, had less chance to enter in permanent marital unions, and were thus, likely to stay unmarried the rest of their
lives. It is speculated that with greater support of temporary marriage by religious authorities, especially during the
1980s and 1990s as the Iranian society was faced with a growing number of young widows following the war with Iraq,
widowed  and  divorced  women  have  been  more  likely  to  pursue  unions  through  temporary  marriages  rather  than
accepting  the  alternative  of  living  alone  and  being  dependent  on  immediate  or  extended  family.  Hence,  it  is  not
surprising that the seven divorced or widowed women in our sample are either in temporary marriage relationships with
previously divorced or widowed men or they are in Sighe relationship as second wives.
The third group of couples consists of men and women who have never been married before but have chosen to
form a union through Sighe. Sixteen couples, 60% of the sample - and thus the majority, were in this category (Table 3).
These couples had met in large family gatherings, educational institutions, workplace, and/or in recreational locations
such as parks. They were almost all young adults and their age distribution appears similar to the age distribution of
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couples living in the permanent marital union. The average for women was 34 and for men, it was 38, resulting in an
average difference of four years. The mean duration of the union for this group was 12 years. Both men and women
among this group of couples had predominantly urban backgrounds. The majority of men had a high school or college
education. All the women had some education but, on average, they had less education than their partners. Men with a
high level of education were married to women with the highest level of education. Overall, this group seems similar to
the cohabiting young adult populations in Western countries.
Table 3. Socio-demographic characteristics of couples with no previous marriages.
Age Men (%) Women (%)
18-29 18.8 31.3
30-39 43.8 31.3
40-49 37.5 37.5
 100 100
   
Mean duration of union 12 years  
   
Education   
Below high school diploma 43.8 68.8
High school diploma or college 56.2 31.2
 100 100
Residential background   
Urban 56.3 62.5
Rural 43.8 37.5
   
Circumstances of meeting   
Within family 62.5  
Within neighborhood 6.3  
Education Institution, work place, parks and restaurants 31.2  
 100  
   
Total number of couples 16  
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our findings are limited by the nature of a purposive non-probability sample from an urban area in Western Iran.
We also did not have any sample couples who have been engaged in temporary marriages that have been dissolved.
Despite these limitations, our results suggest that couples in our sample were living in committed relationships that
were nevertheless non-binding. They provided no evidence that they view their situations as “one night stands” or as
relationships that are arranged for “temporary pleasure” -- nor can their relationships be described simply as “legal
prostitution.” The most striking aspect of our findings is the continuity and the length of Sighe unions in almost all of
the 27 cases we interviewed.
We observed three distinct patterns among our sample couples. These three groups were divided based on age and
pre-Sighe union marital status. There is a distinct traditional pattern in which older men with established families seek
Sighe  unions with younger  wives.  This  pattern has existed and is  as  old as  the existence of  the rule  of  Sighe.  This
pattern may suggest that married men seek pleasure through practicing Sighe, but it does not suggest “legal prostitution”
asserted by some scholars. The second pattern appears more a matter of convenience for both men and women who
have exited from their permanent marriage through divorce or widowhood. Having gone through permanent marriages
in their young adulthood and now in their middle ages, they may be seeking companionship and a sexual partner but
wish to avoid the detailed ceremonies and practices of permanent marriages for the second time, thus preferring a Sighe
marriage. Still, continuity is evident in this as in other groups.
The third pattern observed in our sample involves young, never-married adults who chose a Sighe relationship, thus
acting out of individual choice. While marriage has long marked the transition to adulthood in Iran, these couples chose
to at least delay the traditional transition to adulthood (i.e., legal permanent marriage) by pursuing higher education
and/or  economic  success  while  entering  a  non-contractual  relationship  with  non-specified  termination  plans.  It  is
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possible  that  these  couples  consider  an  intimate,  romantic,  sexual  relationship  as  part  of  their  experiences  in  their
transition to adulthood. In any case, they are contravening the conventional linear approach from education to job to a
lifetime permanent marriage. This, thus, represents a new attitude, particularly among young women, toward marriage
[20].
It is possible that economic constraints have created the conditions for the development of this new attitude and
approach, but there are also indications that a paradigm shift in the perception of adulthood has played a major role in
the emergence of this new pattern. As recent as the 1970s, the transition to adulthood was mainly through marriage and
parenthood, particularly for women. In reality, there did not exist a stage between childhood and adulthood when the
majority of women were married before age 18 and had up to six or seven births by age 30. Similarly, a young male was
not considered an adult until he was married and was a father, parenthood being the most important mark of adulthood.
Yet, in studies with data collected in the late1980s and 1990s among adolescents, there emerged signs that traditional
attitudes toward marriage and adulthood were changing [20 - 22]. These studies suggested that young women and men -
but most particularly women - wanted to approach marriage with love and mutual understanding and not simply as an
adulthood destination. They also began to emphasize their right to engage in other activities such as higher education
and the pursuit of a career. Such perceptions are, in Iran as, throughout much of the world, indications of the strive
towards individualism, autonomy, and self-actualization [22]. To conclude about this cultural and value change as:
“….these days everybody wants to find her or his own way. Society allows this variation and people do not interfere
in your affairs. So, we like to experience other ways and other approaches. It is our individual decision” [23].
Although there are solid data on the declining trend of permanent marriage, the data on the number of and trends in
cohabitation unions based on Sighe do not exist. Ahamadi and colleagues estimate that 9% of young adults in urban
areas participate in cohabitation and 25% are acceptant of such unions [24]. However, such estimates are based on small
selective samples of university students. Popular women's publications such as mehrkhane [25] report much higher
numbers of Sighe unions based on interviews with members of the clergy who are involved in reading and pronouncing
Sighe  between  men  and  women.  Regardless,  any  expression  of  numbers  of  cohabiting  couples  is  hypothetical  and
requires more systematic data collection by the Office of Vital Registration System or a national survey which includes
all marriages. There is also a need for more in-depth data from a larger number of young cohabiting adults about their
perceptions and attitudes regarding individualism and pursuit of adult goals, including marriage and childrearing. We
hypothesize that such data will support assumptions that there has been a somewhat marked expansion of young adult
interest in an adulthood that involves the pursuit of education, economic opportunity, and sexual satisfaction, perhaps
through healthy Sighe cohabiting relationships, and - yes - ultimately marriage and parenthood.
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